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United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola: When Criminal 
Defendants Say No to Drugs 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In light of the "significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs," 1 the Ninth Circuit 
joined several other circuits2 in requiring the government to meet 
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence when it wants 
to forcibly medicate criminal defendants to make them competent to 
stand trial. 3 
If the government wants to medicate a criminal defendant 
against his will, it must proceed in one of two ways, depending on 
whether the defendant is dangerous. First, the government can seek 
to medicate a dangerous defendant in what is called a Harper4 
hearing. This is the simpler method because "the inquiry . . . is 
usually more 'objective and manageable,"' 5 and the Supreme Court 
has held that an elevated standard is not needed in this kind of 
inquiry. 6 Second, the government can seek to forcibly medicate a 
nondangerous defendant for the sole purpose of restoring 
competency to stand trial. This second situation is called a Self 
inquiry and is the focus of the Ruiz-Gaxiola case. 
l. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990). 
2. "(E)vcry circuit to address the issue has concluded that the government must bear 
the burden of proving the relevant facts [in a Sell inquiry] by clear and convincing evidence." 
United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Bush, 585 F.3d 806,814 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591,598 (3d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Payne, 539 F.3d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114 (lOth Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 
(2d Cir. 2004)). 
3. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691-92. 
4. !d. at 689. A Harper hearing is an analysis that revolves around a balancing of the 
interests in protecting the public and the defendant from the danger that the defendant poses 
in his unmedicated state. The Supreme Court believes this to be an easier, more concrete test 
than that of a Sell hearing, which involves more abstract and metaphysical concepts like trial 
fairness and competence. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003). 
5. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 
6. Harper, 494 U.S. at 235. 
7. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 700. 
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In United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, defendant Vincente Ruiz-
Gaxiola was charged with unlawful reentry and was found to be 
incompetent to stand trial due to a rare mental disorder.8 He refused 
medication that was intended to restore his competency, and the 
district court ordered that he be forcibly medicated.9 On review, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the government had not proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that the proposed treatment was medically 
appropriate or that it would significantly further the government's 
prosecutorial interest. 10 
The court's decision was correct, but it missed an opportunity to 
simplifY applying these decisions by closing the door on Sell inquiries 
in situations in which defendants arc accused of nonserious crimes. 
The court should have determined that the government never has an 
important enough interest in prosecuting nonviolent individuals to 
justifY forcible medication; the goals of prosecution and punishment 
either cannot be accomplished with these types of defendants or will 
be accomplished better by some other means that do not require 
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. 
Part II of this Note gives a short background on the law of 
forced medication, followed by a discussion of the facts and analysis 
of the Ruiz-Gaxiola case. Part III explains the retributivist and 
utilitarian rationales for punishment and discusses why these 
justifications may not apply to defendants who are found to be 
incompetent. Part IV discusses the more humane alternatives that 
can accomplish these utilitarian goals. Part V concludes. 
II. RUIZ-GAXIOLA AND THE LAW OF FORCED MEDICATION 
A. The Cases Up Through Sell 
It is a violation of due process to convict a mentally incompetent 
person. 11 The standard for competency to stand trial requires that a 
person have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and [that] he [have] 
8. Id. at 687. 
9. Id. at 687-88. 
10. Id. at 706-07. 
11. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,378 (1966). 
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a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him. " 12 
Prosecutors and courts have adopted different methods of 
restoring a defendant to a level of competency that would allow him 
to stand trial. In some cases, they have attempted to commit the 
defendant to a mental health ward, even though the defendant was 
not dangerous, in an effort to restore him to competency. 13 These 
commitments were often indefinite and would sometimes extend 
well beyond the statutory-maximum sentence of the alleged crime. 14 
The Supreme Court invalidated these indefinite commitments 
because they were based solely on a defendant's incompetence to 
stand trial. 1" If a defendant is held in an institution to restore him to 
competency, he can only be held for a reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine "whether there is a substantial chance of his 
attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable fl1ture." 16 If the 
state does not determine that a person would regain competence, 
then it must undertake a standard civil commitment to continue to 
hold the defendant. 17 
With the advent and increased efficacy of antipsychotic 
medication, it became simpler to restore defendants to competency 
by administering these drugs. Most early cases held that it was 
permissible to medicate criminal defendants to make them 
competent to stand trial. 18 This trend is explained somewhat by a 
common perception among courts that "the administ[ ration] of 
drugs under proper medical supervision has effectively restored many 
mentally ill citizens to a useful life in which they can function as 
normally as other citizens not so impaired. " 1Y This misperception ran 
12. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 ( 1960). 
13. See, c.._q., Jackson v. Indiana,406 U.S. 715,719 (1972). 
14. Said. at 717-19. In Jack.ron P. Indiana, the defendant had bet·n indicted on two 
counts of robbery involving less than $10, and he spent three-and-a-half years in involuntary 
institutionalization. MICHAEL L. PERU~ ET AL., COMPETENCE !~ THE LAW: !:'ROM LEGAL 
THEORY TO CL!~!CAL APPLIC:ATIO~ 60-61 (200R). 
15. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 720. 
16. !d. at 733. 
17. !d. at 73R. 
18. Sec, eg., People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 7R7, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 19R4); State v. 
Hayes, 3R9 A.2d 1379, 13R2 (N.H. 197R); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C. 197R); 
State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977); Craig v. State, 704 S.W.2d 
94R, 950 (Tex. Ct. App. 19R6 ); State v. Lover, 707 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
19. PERLIN ET AL, supra note 14, at 34 (quoting Stacy, 556 S.W.2d at 557-58) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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contrary to the understanding that common side effects of these 
drugs turned defendants into drooling, sedated shells of their former 
selves. 20 
Courts eventually grew into the understanding that defendants 
had a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. " 21 The Supreme Court began 
its major development of the law of forced administration in 
Washington v. HarpeY-2 and Riggins v. Nevada. 23 In Harper, the 
Court approved forced administration on prison inmates that were 
mentally ill and either were severely disabled or posed "a likelihood 
of serious harm" to themselves, others, or their property. 24 In 
Riggins, the Court reversed the ddendant's capital conviction 
because the state court had refused to allow him to discontinue his 
use of antipsychotic medication during his trial. 25 The Court found 
that without an "overriding justification" for forcible medication, the 
government could not overcome the liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted medication-an interest that requires at least as much 
protection in pretrial detainees as in inmates. 26 The Court did not 
reach the question whether forcible medication could be continued if 
discontinuation would result in the defendant's incompetence.27 
The Court first reached this question in Sell v. United States. 2~ 
Charles Sell, a dentist who had a history of mental illness, was 
accused of insurance fraud. 29 After Sell was found to be incompetent 
to stand trial, he was hospitalized for treatment but refused 
antipsychotic medications against the staff's recommendation. 30 After 
several hearings in different judicial and quasi-judicial venues, the 
Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the government could 
forcibly medicate Sell to restore his competency to stand trial:' 1 
20. Id. at 150. 
21. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990). 
22. Id. 
23. Rigginsv.Nevada,504U.S.127(1992). 
24. Harper, 494 U.S. at 210,215. 
25. R(q_qins, 504 U.S. at 129. 
26. Id.at135. 
27. Id. at 136. 
28. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
29. ld. at 169-70. 
30. Id. at 171. 
31. Id. at 171-75. The decision passed first from a reviewing psychiatrist that approved 
tixciblc medication because of Sell's dangerousness and incompetence, to the Medical Center's 
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The Court held that "the Constitution allows the Government 
to administer [antipsychotic] drugs, even against the defendant's 
will, in limited circumstances. " 32 The Court reasoned that the 
government can administer antipsychotic drugs against the 
defendant's will if four conditions arc satisfied. 33 A court must 
conclude that (I) "important governmental interests are at stake;"34 
( 2) "involuntary medication will significantly further those 
concomitant state interests; " 3s ( 3) "involuntary medication is 
necessary to further those interests; " 36 ( 4) "administration of the 
drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical 
interest in light of his medical condition. " 37 The Court indicated that 
this inquiry was intended for situations in which the government is 
seeking forced medication solely to render the defendant competent 
to stand trial. 3B A diff-erent inquiry would apply in situations in which 
the defendant either is dangerous to himself or others, or he is at risk 
of suffering grave health problems. 39 
Since 2003, the framework established in the Sell decision has 
been the guiding analysis used in cases regarding nondangerous 
criminal defendants who refuse antipsychotic medication. 40 
administrative review that found that Sell was dangerous and that medical intervention was the 
strategy most likely to restore Sell to competency. Next, the kderal magistrate reviewed the 
findings of the administrative review board and found that Sell was a danger to himself and 
others, <111d that antipsychotic medication was the only way to make him less dangerous. This 
decision was then reviewed by the district court, which found that Sell was not dangerous but 
upheld the order to f(>rcibly medicate him to serve the government's compelling interest in 
prosecuting him. Finally, a divided panel of the court of appeals atlirmcd the district court's 
holding. The court of appeals also t(mnd that Sell was not dangerous but that the 
government's interest in prosecution was sufficient to overcome Sell's interest in avoiding 
unwanted medication. 
32. Id. at 16':!. 
33. Id. at 169, 17':!-81. 
.34. Id. at 180 . 
35. Id.at181. 
36. !d. 
37. I d. 
38. I d. 
3':!. ld.at182. 
40. Sa United States v. Ruiz-(3axiob, 623 F.3d 684, 6':!2 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Bush, 585 !:'.3d 806,814 (4th Cir. 200':!); United States\'. Grape, 549 F.3d 591,598 
(3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Payne, 53<) !:'.3d 505,508-09 (6th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Bradley, 417 !:'.3d 1107, 1114 (lOth Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 
160 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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B. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola41 
Ruiz was arrested for unlawful reentry, and before trial he was 
diagnosed with a rare mental illness that rendered him incompetent 
to stand trial.42 Under the admonition in Sell,43 the magistrate judge 
first conducted a Harper hearing to sec whether forcible medication 
was justified because of grave health risk or dangerousness.44 Finding 
that Ruiz did not meet either of these criteria, the federal magistrate 
conducted a Sell inquiry to see whether the defendant met the four 
requirements for forcible medication.4 " With the help of expert 
witnesses who testified in opposite directions about every Sell factor, 
the federal magistrate concluded that Ruiz's situation met all four of 
the Sell requirements and recommended that Ruiz be forcibly 
medicated, despite Ruiz's objcctions.46 The district court adopted 
the federal magistrate's recommendation, and Ruiz appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit. 47 
Before moving to the merits of the case, the court of appeals 
discussed the language in the governing Supreme Court cases calling 
for an "overriding justification,"48 requmng protection of a 
"significant liberty interest,"49 and allowing forcible medication only 
in "limited circumstances. " 50 Additionally, the court of appeals 
considered relevant precedent from its jurisdiction reasoning that this 
language demonstrated a "reluctance to permit involuntary 
medication except in rare circumstanccs" 51 because of the "error-
prone analysis"52 of a Sell inquiry. 53 The Ninth Circuit ultimately 
41. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 f.3d at 691-92. 
42. Id. at 688-89. 
43. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 182. 
44. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 f.3d at 689. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 690. 
47. Id. 
48. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
49. Washington v·. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221 (1990). 
50. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003 ); Jee Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 f.3d at 
691-92. 
51. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691 (quoting United States v. Rivcra-Guerrcro, 426 
F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52. Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 915 (9th 
Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53. Id. 
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decided to require the government to meet a "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard to satisfy each of the Sell requirements. 54 
Moving on to the merits, the Ninth Circuit considered the first 
Sell requirement "that important governmental interests are at 
stake. " 55 The court reasoned that "[ t ]he Government's interest in 
bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is 
important."56 As the Supreme Court had stated, this serious crime 
could be either "a serious crime against the person or a serious crime 
against property."57 In addition to the "seriousness" of the crime, 
the court of appeals weighed "the specific circumstances" of Ruiz's 
case, including the following: the guideline range for the crime of 
which he was accused; the likelihood that he would commit this 
crime again; the length of time he had already been confined; and 
the possibility that he would be committed if unable to proceed to 
trial. 58 Applying these factors, the court of appeals held that the 
lower court did not err in determining that the government had an 
important interest in prosecuting Ruiz for his crime of unlawful 
reentry. 59 The court of appeals reached this conclusion, despite the 
fact that this "crime is neither against persons nor property," and 
that Ruiz had already been confined for forty-seven months. 60 
The second Sell requirement is that the government must 
establish that "involuntary medication will significantly further its 
interest in prosecuting the defendant for the charged offense."61 To 
demonstrate this, the government must prove that the drugs are 
"substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial," and that the drugs are "substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to 
assist counsel in conducting a trial defense. "62 The court of appeals 
criticized the federal magistrate and the district court for concluding 
that this requirement was satisfied; they based their conclusion on 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 691 (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
56. Id. at 693 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
58. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 693~95. 
59. Jd.at695. 
60. Id. 
61. I d. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
62. Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the treating physician stating that the proposed medical regimen was 
"designed" to satisfY the second Sell prong. 63 Because enhanced 
tactual findings were unlikely to be made on remand, the Ninth 
Circuit chose to resolve the question with what was available in the 
record. 64 The court delved into the testimony and evidence offered 
by both ~ides about these factors. 65 On the one hand, the 
government had presented only two studies and a practice guideline 
that were either effectively discredited or contained inapplicable 
extrapolations.66 On the other hand, the defense had presented 
"multiple scientific studies" that the government did not even 
attempt to discredit. 67 The court stated that the government could 
not meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence by "rely[ing] 
on generalities and fail[ ing] to apply [its] views to Ruiz 's condition 
with specificity. " 68 The court of appeals held that the government 
failed to satisfY the second Sell factor. 69 
The third Sell requirement is that "the government must 
establish 'that involuntary medication is necessary to further' its 
interest in prosecuting the defendant. " 70 This requirement depends 
upon a positive finding of the second Sell requirement because a 
proposed treatment cannot be necessary to further the government's 
interest unless it significantly furthers the government's interest in 
the flrst place.71 This failing alone was sufficient to lead the court of 
appeals to hold that the district court clearly erred in flnding that the 
government had fulfilled the third Sell factor. 72 Still, the court went 
to the trouble to draw attention to some "extremely troubling" 
reasoning on the part of the district court. 73 The district court 
rejected the defense expert's proposed alternative treatment solely 
because the expert had spent less time observing and interviewing 
the defendant than the government had. 74 This was disturbing 
63. Id. at 696. 
64. Id. 
65. See id. at 696-700. 
66. Id. at 700. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 701. 
70. Id. (quoting Sell\'. United States, 539 U.S. 166, !Sl (2003)). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 701,703. 
73. Id. at 702. 
74. Id. 
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because it is common for a government expert to have much more 
access to the defendant than a defense expert because the 
government is housing the defendant and providing his ongoing 
medical treatment?5 
The fourth part of the Sell test allows a court to authorize 
involuntary medication only if "administration of the drugs is 
medically appropriate. "76 This requires that the drugs be "in the 
patient)s best medical interest in light of his medical condition. " 77 
The court of appeals explained that this inquiry is similar to that of 
the second requirement, except that it is expanded to include "those 
consequences [of the treatment] that may not affect the defendant's 
trial in any way." 78 This focus on the overall welfare of the 
defendant-patient "reflects the importance of the liberty interests at 
stake in an involuntary medication order. " 79 The court of appeals 
considered the same evidence it used to analyze the second 
requirement and held that the government had failed to fulfill this 
fourth Sell requirement. 80 
The court of appeals reversed the order for f(xced administration 
of antipsychotic medication because the district court erred 111 
finding that the government had met the last three Sell factors. 81 
III. WHY THE COURTS Do NOT NEED TO UNDERTAKE THE 
EXTENSIVE SELL INQUIRY 
The Sell test was designed to apply to incompetent defendants 
accused of "serious, but nonviolent, crimes."82 Being incompetent 
typically means that the defendant fails to understand even the 
nature of the proceedings against him.83 If the defendant's mental 
capacity is diminished to that extent, the goals of prosecution and 
punishment will not be satisfied. Section A discusses how, under 
retributive theory, a defendant with diminished mental capacity is 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 703 (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
77. Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
78. Id. at 704. 
79. Id. at 703. 
80. Id. at 705-07. 
81. Id. at 707. 
82. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. 
83. See the discussion of the Dusky standard, supra Part II.A. 
485 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
not "culpable" and therefore not deserving of punishment. Section B 
discusses how, under utilitarian theory, none of the usual "greater 
goods" that punishment accomplishes can be achieved with 
incompetent criminal defendants. Accordingly, if incompetent 
criminal defendants refuse antipsychotic medication, courts should 
be able to dispose of their cases without the detailed, fact-specific 
inquiry required by the Sell test. 
A. The Failure of the Retributivist Rationale in Punishing 
Incompetent Defendants 
"The retributive theory of justice holds that 'the punishment of 
crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer, 
and that justice, or the moral order, requires the institution of 
punishment. "'84 According to retributivists, people "should be 
punished in proportion to their blameworthiness."85 
Blameworthiness is composed of two factors: the seriousness of the 
crime and the culpability of the offender. 86 Culpability is made up of 
an actor's intent and capacity to conform to the law.87 These factors 
help to explain why so little societal blame is attached to adults 
failing to use turn signals ( nonserious crime), adults getting into 
auto accidents (no intent), and minors committing offenses (reduced 
capacity). 
As far as the seriousness of the crime, the other ingredient of 
blameworthiness, the Sell analysis applies only to incompetent 
defendants accused of "serious, but nonviolent, crimes. " 88 Though 
the Supreme Court has stated that bringing a person accused of a 
serious crime to trial is an important interest,89 the justifications for 
84. Louis K1plow & Steven Shavell, F11irnesJ Verms Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1228 (2001) (quoting Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE E~C:YCI.OPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 29,30 (Paul Edwards cd., 1967)). 
85. RichardS. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REv. 67, 73 (2005 ). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. W.H. Walsh interprets Hegel to mean that an olfcndcr deserves punishment only 
if he "knows what he is doing and so commits himself to accepting the consequences of his act, 
including punishment if his crime is detected." W. H. WALSH, HEGELIAN ETHICS 68 ( 1969). 
88. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003). 
89. Id. at 180. What constitutes a "serious crime" is a much-disputed question. Some 
look to sentencing guidelines, which are used to determine what a "serious crime" is for 
purposes of mandating a jury trial. Others look to the language in Sell concerning crimes 
against property and crimes against the person. This topic is ably covered in Stewart B. 
Harman, Restoration of Competency Through Involuntary Medication: Applying the Sell Factors, 
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forgoing a Sell inquiry do not depend on whether the defendant is 
accused of a serious crime.\)0 
The measures of culpability tor the mentally incompetent are all 
necessarily reduced. First, the formation of intent requires an 
understanding of consequences and an idea of desired outcomes.91 
The failure of the mentally incompetent to meet this requirement of 
culpability is at the heart of the justification for the insanity 
defense. 92 This inability to form the requisite intent is also linked to 
the second factor: capacity to conform to the law. As with intent, a 
mentally incompetent person has a reduced capacity to conform to 
the law because he is not rational. 93 Because the mentally 
incompetent defendant has a reduced capacity to conform to the law 
and to form a requisite intent, he is less culpable and less 
blameworthy in the eyes of retributivists. 
The retributivist rationale for punishment does not support 
punishing mentally incompetent defendants. Unless the government 
can find other justifications for its "important" interest in 
prosecuting and punishing nondangerous, mentally incompetent 
defendants, the Sell test is unnecessary. 
B. The Failure of the Several Utilitarian Rationales in Punishing 
Incompetent Defendants 
Utilitarianism seeks the overall maximization of good or 
pleasure, and justifies the use of punishment (a bad) to accomplish 
4 APPALACHIA:--; ].L. 127, 133-38 (2005 ). 
90. Seriousness of a crime is necessary lc>r blameworthiness, but it is not sufficient. 
Because an incompetent defendant cannot meet the other necessary requirement, culpability, it 
does not matter whether he is accused of a serious crime. for the purposes of this article, I 
assume that incompetent dctendants face a Sell hearing only if they have committed a serious 
crime. 
91. I GEORGE DALE COLLINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCER>IING IDIOTS, 
LUI':ATICS, AND OTHER PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS 671 (London, W. Reed, 1812) 
("Such a man, so destitute of all power of judgment, could have no intention at all."). 
92. S. SHELDO:--; GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 109 ( 1927) 
("The defense of criminal irresponsibility by reason of insanity is ... but a specific instance of 
the more general legal proposition, that no person can be held criminally liable and punishable 
tor an illegal act, unless he has, as it is sometimes put, 'sufticient mental capacity' to 'entertain 
a criminal intent,' or to have a mens rea, or 'guilty mind."' (footnote omitted)). 
93. See IGOR P!UMORATZ, )LTSTIHING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 79 (1989) (describing 
rationality as a ti.mdamental trait of humans that is necessary tor culpability because a person 
that lacks rationality is a slave to his animal-like impulses rather than a conscious being 
choosing his own path). 
487 
BlUGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
greater good.94 This greater good is most frequently accomplished 
through one of tlve possible mechanisms: "rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, and 
denunciation. " 95 Each of these is either entirely ineflective with 
mentally incompetent offenders or is better accomplished through 
other available methods aside from a criminal conviction. 
Rehabilitation is likely to be more effective with mentally 
incompetent individuals than with sane criminals who have 
intentionally and freely committed antisocial acts.96 However, the 
condemnatory and antagonistic approach of a criminal trial and 
conviction followed by incarceration is not an effective means of 
rehabilitation, regardless of the mental state of the accused. 97 It 
would be more effective to enroll the accused m a treatment 
program that docs not require medication or to pursue 
commitment.98 
Incapacitation is accomplished by keeping the offender from 
general society and preventing him from harming society with his 
criminal acts.99 This method of crime prevention is just as dlective 
with the mentally ill as with the mentally well; both can be "kept 
away" in the same manner. One difference is that the mentally ill can 
be removed from society by civil commitment in order to protect the 
person, to protect society, or to care for a person that is severely 
disabled. 100 This incapacitation through commitment is preferable to 
incarceration because of the benefits of possible rehabilitation and 
more humane treatment of defendants who refuse medication. 101 
94. I d. at 15-18 (describing the utilitarian judgment of actions based solely on the 
consequences of pleasure or suffering they bring about). 
95. Frase, sup1-a note 85, at 70. 
96. See id. ("Rehabilitation ... assumes that the otlender has identifiable and tre.1tabk 
problems which cause him to commit crimes."). 
97. Sec Helen M. Annis, Treatment in Correctiom: Martinson Was Right, 22 CAN. 
PSYCHO!.. 321, 321-22, 325 ( 1981) t()r a survey of studies concluding that incarceration of 
defendants is an indkctive means of rehabilitation. 
98. See Crystal Mueller & A. Michael Wvlie, Examining the Ej]Cctivencss of tm 
Inten,ention Designed for the Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 
891, 892-94 ( 2007) (identifYing the strengths and weaknesses of studies used to support the 
use of medication to restore competency and outlining alternative competency restoration 
methods). 
99. PRIMORATZ, supra note 93, at 19-20. 
100. PERLIN ET AI.., supra note 14, at 134-35. 
101. PRIMORATZ, supra note 93, at 24-25 (noting that one of the t()Lir limits of 
punishment that utilitarians subscribe to is needlessness, and that this is a limiting factor when 
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Mentally incompetent persons have such a reduced rational 
capacity that it makes the possibility of specific deterrence entirely 
nonexistent. 102 Not only are a mentally incompetent defendant's 
motivations not influenced by experiencing his own punishment, but 
also he is not affected by seeing other mentally ill defendants 
punished. Thus, general deterrence is as ineffective as specific 
deterrence. Denunciation involves broad societal enforcement 
through means of societal cues and social norms. 103 An inability to 
perceive, let alone understand, social norms is a characteristic of 
incompetence, 104 which would make the effort of reducing crime 
commissions by the mentally ill by means of denunciation completely 
incfJective. 
Like the retributivist rationale, the utilitarian rationale tor 
punishment fails to justifY punishment of mentally incompetent 
defendants. Without an underlying justification or purpose, the 
government cannot demonstrate that it has an "important" interest 
in prosecuting and punishing nondangerous mentally incompetent 
defendants. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO FORCIBLE MEDICATION 
Undoubtedly the government has an interest in accomplishing 
the purposes behind prosecution and punishment of criminal 
defendants. 105 When an incompetent defendant refuses medication 
that would possibly restore his competence, the prosecution and 
punishment of this defendant is hindered. The purposes behind 
prosecution and punishment, however, can be accomplished by 
means that do not require forced medication of the incompetent 
the goals of the punishment can he accomplished by other means that are either more effective 
or less costly). 
102. !d. at 24 ("[I Jnsane persons ought not to be punished 
cannot ctliciently prevent future ofknses."). 
103. !:'rase, supra note 85, at 72. 
. [The punishment] 
104. According to the Dusky standard, an incompetent defendant lacks a rational 
understanding of the proceedings against him that would allow him to assist in his defense. If a 
person is incapahlc of rational understanding of such an important event as a criminal 
proceeding against him, then he is unlikely to have a significant appreciation of something as 
subtle as social norms. Also, fix many mental illnesses that contribute to incompetence, an 
inahility to perceive and contiJrm to social norms is a diagnostic feature. E.g., AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIM;NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 01' MDITAL DISORDERS 285 
(4th cd. 1994) (listing the diagnostic characteristics of schizophrenia). 
105. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
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defendant. Among the available options, two will be discussed 
below: imputed election of a nonmedication treatment plan and civil 
commitment. 
A. Imputed Election of a Nonmedication Treatment Plan 
Suppose an incompetent defendant has been lawfully arrested 
and is legally being held in anticipation of his pending criminal trial. 
When he is found to be incompetent, his trial will be postponed 
pending restoration of his competence. Medication is often favored 
by the courts, the government, and the defendant because it can 
restore competence more quickly than other forms of treatment106 
and facilitate a speedy trial. If a defendant chooses to avoid the side 
effects of antipsychotic pharmaceuticals by refusing medication, then 
he could be deemed to have chosen to undergo an alternative 
program designed to restore competency without medication. 107 
Though it may take longer, 108 such an alternative program may be 
equally effective in restoring the defendant to competency to stand 
trial. 109 
If the defendant's refusal of medication were imputed to him as 
by election, it would accomplish the same objectives as pursuing a 
forcible medication order and proceeding with prosecution. If the 
defendant is not restored to competency, this treatment and holding 
period incapacitate the defendant, provide a means of rehabilitation, 
and act as a specific or general deterrent (insofar as deterrents can be 
effective with the mentally incompetent) against refusing medication 
because of the longer pretrial incarceration. If the defendant's 
competency is restored, the government would be able to proceed 
with the trial just as it would if it forcibly medicated the defendant. 
The main difference is that with the treatment and holding period, 
the government does not have to deprive the defendant of his 
significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication. 
106. Stephen J. Morse, Involuntary Competence, 21 BEHAV. Scr. & L. 311,316 (2003) 
("[A]ntipsychotic medication ... [provides] the most etlicient means to restore a psychotic 
defendant's competence, although not the only means."). 
107. These alternative methods include legal-concept teaching with a cognitive-
problem-solving approach and other therapies focused on restoring rationality and increased 
sense of reality. Mueller & Wylie, supra note 98, at 894. 
108. See Morse, supra note 106. 
109. See Mueller & Wylie, supra note 98, at 893-94. The literature is a bit thin on 
studies testing the effectiveness of alternative methods in restoring competency. 
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B. Civil Commitment 
In addition to being a fallback for defendants that foreseeably 
cannot be restored to competency, 110 the government could pursue 
civil commitment in cases in which incompetent defendants refuse 
medication. Civil commitment would accomplish all the goals that a 
traditional punishment accomplishes with the mentally ill. As 
discussed above, 111 traditional punishment is only effective at 
incapacitation of mentally ill defendants. Civil commitment is equally 
effective at incapacitation, and it has the added benefit of promoting 
rehabilitation better than incarceration. 112 One wrinkle in this option 
is that most states require that a person be dangerous to be 
committed.m And if a defendant is dangerous, a court will never 
reach a Sell inquiry. 114 However, many states also allow commitment 
for people who are unable to care for themselves. 115 Competence to 
stand trial is such a low standard of capacity that incompetent 
defendants could well meet the standard for commitment due to 
inability to care for oneself. u 6 This commitment would accomplish 
the goal of incapacitation, and perhaps rehabilitation, without the 
government needing to deprive the defendant of the significant 
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the objectives behind prosecution and punishment arc 
not met with nondangerous, mentally incompetent criminal 
defendants, the government cannot be said to have an "important" 
interest in bringing the defendant to trial. The government should 
employ more humane means-means that do not require forced 
medication-to reach these objectives. Because the government 
cannot show that it has an "important" interest in prosecuting these 
110. Id. at 738. 
111. Supra Part lll.B. 
112. See Annis, supra note 97; Mueller & Wylie, supra note 98, at 893-94. 
113. PERLIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 139-42. The issue of dangerousness is 
troublesome because of its inconsistent and broadly divergent interpretation within and among 
ditlerent states. 1t is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss this issue further, but this is an 
area in need of much thought, refi:>rm, and a consistent standard. 
114. Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003). 
115. PERLIN ETAL., .rupra note 14, at 143-47. 
116. See discussion of the Dusky standard for competence in Part II.A. 
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defendants, the Sell test cannot be met and the courts should no 
longer authorize forced medication of nondangerous, mentally 
incompetent defendants. 
Adam Dayton* 
* ].D. candidate, April 2013, ]. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
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